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The sustainability of a dened benet pay-as-you-go (DBPAYG) pension system is in-
vestigated in the context of an overlapping-generations model of endogenous fertility
with heterogeneous agents. The model places particular emphasis on the time costs of
child rearing. It illustrates the mechanism by which such a pension system can increase
the opportunity cost of having children and hence sow the seeds of its own destruction.
The model is then extended to allow for fertility-based payments. Such a system is more
likely to be sustainable. The model highlights a number of issues that are of relevance
to a number of OECD countries that have generous DBPAYG pension systems and
falling fertility rates. (JEL H55, J13, J14)
Keywords: Pay-as-you-go pension; Dened benet; Overlapping generations; Endoge-
nous fertility; Labor participation Rate; Heterogeneous agents
This article is based on chapter 4 of my PhD dissertation. See Steurer (2008).1 Introduction
Most OECD countries have pay-as-you-go (PAYG) public pension systems in which
current pension payments are nanced by contributions of the current working pop-
ulation. Hence the size of the retired population relative to the working population
(the old age dependency ratio) is an important determinant of the sustainability of
pension systems. Falling fertility rates in most OECD countries together with rising
life expectancy and earlier retirement are increasing the old-age-dependency ratio and
thereby threatening the sustainability of public pension systems (see for example Dis-
ney (2000), Rother, Catenaro and Schwab (2004) and Cournede and Gonand (2006)).1
For this reason there exists pressure in most OECD countries to reform the pension
system. One possible avenue is to switch from a PAYG to a funded system. Such a
switch is politically hard to achieve in a democratic society since it will make at least
one generation strictly worse o (see Breyer (1989)). Rather than investigating whether
and how such a switch from a PAYG to a funded pension system should occur, I take
the existence of a PAYG pension system as given and investigate the sustainability of
such a system.
In general, a PAYG pension system can take either the `dened contribution' or `de-
ned benet' form. Dened contribution (DCPAYG) systems levy a xed contribution
or wage tax per period and divide the resulting amount among the current pensioners.
In dened benet pay-as-you-go (DBPAYG) systems pensioners have the right to claim
a certain pension and the government levies the tax that is necessary to cover these
obligations. With stable population structures and per capita incomes contributions
paid and benets received are the same under both systems. But the pension received
by the old and contributions paid by the young dier when the population structure
is changing. If the population is decreasing pensioners in a DCPAYG system receive
smaller and smaller pensions as the old age dependency ratio increases. In a DBPAYG
1By sustainability I mean that the pension system is able to deliver on the payments promised to
each generation while maintaining a balanced budget.
1system the pension payments to the old remain unaltered and the current working pop-
ulation have to bear the burden of the aging society. Their contribution rates rise in
order to nance the pensions of the older generation.
PAYG pension systems also dier in the amount of intragenerational redistribution
present in the system. The pension could be uniform (i.e., highly redistributive) or
an increasing function of an individual's contributions. For example, public pensions
are fairly uniform in the U.K., the Netherlands and Australia. Such a system is often
referred to as a 
at-rate pension. In other countries (e.g., Germany, Austria, or Italy)
public pension benets vary signicantly depending on an individual's contributions
during their working life. These are so-called earnings-related pensions. Describing the
German pension system, B orsch-Supan (2000) writes:
\[P]ublic pensions are roughly proportional to labor income averaged over
the entire life course and feature only few redistributive properties."
In practice, most OECD countries have earnings related DBPAYG systems. I therefore
focus primarily on the implications of these systems.
In recent years the focus in the pension literature has shifted towards the impli-
cations of falling fertility rates on the sustainability of PAYG pension systems, with
fertility modeled endogenously. In a model of endogenous fertility the relationship be-
tween fertility rates and PAYG pension systems works in two directions. Under the
assumption that the demand for children is at least partially an investment decision
(parents expecting children to provide for them during old age) it is possible to show
that the introduction of a public pension system is very likely to reduce the demand for
children. Not only is it the case that low rates of fertility put pressure on the public
pension system; the public pension system itself contributes to the `old age crisis' by
reducing the demand for children (see for example Cigno (1993), Nishimura and Zhang
(1995), Kolmar (1997), Wigger (1999), Cigno, Luporini and Pettini (2003), and Cigno
and Werding (2007)).
As in Cigno (1993), Rosati (1996) I assume that the sole reason for having children
2is that they provide parents with support during old age. This support is provided
by the child in the form of a xed amount money transfer to the aging parent. Given
this assumption, an earnings-related pension system will reduce the incentive to have
children more than a 
at-rate system. This is the case as under an earnings-related
system, people who substitute child raising with increased investments in market related
human capital not only earn higher incomes (leading to higher pension claims), they
also do not miss contribution times due to child rearing (also leading to higher pension
claims).
It also makes a dierence whether this interdependency of fertility levels and pension
sustainability is analyzed in a DBPAYG or dened contribution PAYG (DCPAYG)
setting. While it can be shown that the introduction of a DCPAYG public pension
system (potentially) reduces fertility levels - the question of sustainability cannot be
addressed in such system. The contribution rate (tax rate) levied on working income
remains stable in DC systems and once introduced a DC system never goes bust. The
increase in the tax burden due to decreased fertility rates and population aging, which
is presently experienced in many OECD countries, cannot be modeled in an DC pension
system. Some authors address the issue of rising contribution rates in DC PAYG systems
by exogenously introducing such increases in the contribution rates (see for example
Kolmar (1997), Nishimura and Zhang (1992, 1995), and Zhang and Zhang (1998)).
However, the DBPAYG models developed here allow me to endogenously model the
development of the contribution rate needed to keep the system running.
Since too low rates of population growth are bad for PAYG pension systems, the
decision of an individual to have a child creates a positive externality. Under a DC-
PAYG system, the beneciaries of this externality are the rest of the population of the
same generation as the parent. The child in period t will subsequently pay pension con-
tributions in period t+1, which will be paid out to the then retired parent generation.2
2It is assumed throughout that generation t is born in period t 1, is of young (working) age during
period t and old during period t + 1.
3Under a DBPAYG system, the beneciaries are the rest of the population of the same
generation as the child. This is because one extra child in period t reduces the pension
burden that must be borne by working age adults in period t + 1.
Endogenous fertility pension models often assume that individuals supply labor in-
elastically into the labor market. In return they receive money income which can be used
to rear children, buy consumer goods, and save for old age (if a capital market exists).
This representation omits an important factor. While rearing children can involve quite
large monetary costs, a signicant part of the costs is the time spent raising them. This
is especially the case in industrialized countries where the opportunity costs of child
rearing are high. I assume that raising children is time intensive. The consequence of
this assumption is that labor supply also becomes an endogenous variable.
This article extends the literature on public pensions in a number of ways. First,
it uses a model with time intensive child rearing and heterogeneous agents to analyze
fertility decisions and their implications for the sustainability of public pension systems.
Second, by explicitly modeling an earnings-related DBPAYG pension system it discusses
the specic structure of pension system found in many countries around the world
(especially in Western Europe). Given this setup, the tax rate needed to keep the
pension system running can be endogenously determined. And this in turn allows
us to address the question of sustainability of the pension system in an endogenous
manner. Third, a variant on the earnings-related DBPAYG model is developed which
includes a fertility based component and is designed to enhance the sustainability of
the system. Using simulations I show that having a fertility based component in the
DBPAYG pension system increases the likelihood that the system will be sustainable.
This is consistent with the ndings of Cigno, Luporini and Pettini (2003) and Cigno and
Werding (2007), who also consider the impact of fertility payments on PAYG pension
systems. I conclude by discussing some of the implications of my ndings.
42 An Overlapping Generations Model of an Earnings-
Related DB-PAYG Pension System
I use an overlapping generations model in which the actual lifetime of a person is three
periods. Only two of these periods { active life (young) and retirement (old) { will be
modelled explicitly since it is assumed that an individual cannot in
uence their utility
during childhood. These two time periods (young age and old age) are assumed to be of
equal length.3 Each generation consists of two groups of agents: (1   ) percent of the
agents in any cohort are high skilled while  percent of each cohort have low skill levels.
The distribution of skill levels in any generation t are assumed to be constant over time.
Thus, generation t   1 consists of Nt 1 agents, (1   ) percent of them with high and
 percent of them with low skill levels, generation t consists of Nt agents, again (1 )
percent with high and  percent with low skill levels etc. Generation t is young during
period t and old during period t+1. High skilled individuals are more productive than
low skilled individuals. This dierence in productivity will be re
ected in their relative
wage rates, which are given by wh
t and wl
t respectively.
To keep the analysis as simple as possible it is assumed that all young agents can
bear children and that child raising is equally time intensive for high as well as low
skilled individuals. When agents are young they can decide how to spend their time {
one unit { between market work and having children. To highlight the importance of
time in raising children it is assumed that children grow up on parental time alone. Each
potential parent has one unit of time that they can either allocate to the activities of
child rearing or working in the market. t denotes the amount of time that an individual
3The relative period length is important in determining the costs of the public pension system. The
longer the old live and the sooner they retire (the longer the second period) the higher the dependency
ratio and the more expensive the system is for the young. In some European countries early retirement
has become the norm not the exception. For example, 85 percent of Austrian men and 70 percent of
Austrian women who retire do so before the ocial retirement age of 65/60 years (Koch and Thimann
(1999)).
5spends on child rearing. Individuals `produce' children via a linear `child production'
function G(t) with G(t) = t=b which is equivalent to t(G) = bGt. Since t 2 [0;1], 1=b
is the maximum number of children an agent can raise and is determined by human
physiology and medical standards (which are assumed to be xed). For reasons of
convenience it is assumed that the number of children born to an individual can take
any value in this range and that the skill level of children is independent of their parents'
skill level and determined by chance only.
The economy considered is a small open economy with prices and wage rates given
exogenously. But labor is assumed to be immobile and no immigration occurs.4
In the absence of a government pension individuals have to provide themselves for
their old age consumption. They have two ways of doing so. One possibility is to save
part of their income during young age and put it into the capital market where it will
earn interest. The second possibility is to have children which will provide them with
support during old age.
In the model children are viewed purely as investment goods. The support children
provide for their ageing parents is illustrated by the parameter k. Here k is modeled as
a transfer from adult child to elderly parent.
Children are willing to support their elderly parents in this way because `it is tra-
dition to do so'. This family tradition is enforced by the threat of social punishment
for individuals that reneg on their obligations. The value of the social punishment
needs to be higher than the value of k that individuals would have to spend on their
parent.5 Cigno (1993) and Rosati (1996) show how such a family constitution can be
self-enforcing (without relying on social codes and punishments). An alternative way
4B orsch-Supan (1998, 2000) states that Germany would need an immigration stream of about
800,000 persons a year (about 2.5 times the current net immigration rate) to compensate fully for
population aging.
5For individuals who themselves rely on the support of children when old, the family tradition
becomes self-enforcing if it is assumed that individuals who do not care for their parents will not be
cared for by their children.
6to explain positive transfers from children to parents would be to assume that children
have altruistic feelings towards their parents (as done in Nishimura and Zhang (1995),
and Wigger (1999)).
If no government pension system exists, a person i of generation t with high skill
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i;t denotes person i's consumption when young (in period t) and co
i;t her con-
sumption when old (in period t+1). (1+ 
t) represents the growth rate of wages from
period t to t + 1.6 It is assumed here that the support from child to parent also grows
at this rate, such that a person of generation t can expect transfers of k(1+
t)Gi
t when
retiring in period t + 1. The subscript for the individual, i, will be left out in the
following analysis if the meaning remains clear from the context. Since bGi
t denotes the
time individual i spends on rearing children, (1   bGi
t) is the time individual i spends
on the labor market.
For now it is assumed that for high skilled individuals the return from saving beats
the return available via the family tradition. That is: bwh
t Rt+1 > k(1+
t). This implies
that high skilled individuals will have positive savings but no children, thus the average
number of children born to high skill individuals is zero (Gh
t = 0). Solving the above









6It is assumed here that high and low skilled wage rates both grow at the same rate.
7Thus, i's saving rate depends positively on the relative importance i puts on old age
consumption and the wage rate when young. It depends negatively on the size of k. It
does however not depend on the interest rate Rt+1.7
For a low skilled individual j of generation t the budget constraints for young and






















For now it is assumed that for low skilled individuals the return available by investing
in children is higher than the return via the capital market: bwl
tRt+1 < k(1+
t). Thus,
a low skill person will invest in children only. This means that the average savings
rate for low skill individuals will be equal to zero sl
t = 0. This then implies that the
rst order condition of the Cobb-Doublas utility function with respect to the budget














From this follows that the optimal number of children for a low skill individual will











3 ER-DB-PAYG pension system
For the reasons mentioned in section 1 above, the main model presented here will be
an earnings related dened benet pay-as-you-go (ER-DB-PAYG) model.
Public pension benets are determined by a percentage formula over lifetime income.
The structure of the pension system is given exogeneously (e.g. by law or constitution).
The parameter x 2 [0;1] is used to calculate each individual's pension claim. It denotes
7This is a consequence of the Cobb-Douglas utility function used here.
8the replacement rate of the PAYG pension system. Multiplying i's period t income by
x will give her public pension benet in period t + 1. Individual pensions therefore
depend on x, the wage rate, and on the amount of time a person has spent on the labor
market, (1 bGi
t). The individual treats her promised pension payment as a parameter
when maximizing utility. Even though x can in principle be changed from one period
to the next it is assumed that such a change cannot be applied to people who worked
under the old system. That is, existing pension contracts have to be honored.8
To nance the PAYG pension system, the government levies an income tax, vt, on
income. The level of vt is determined endogenously to balance the government's budget
in each period.
3.1 High Skilled Individuals
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We assumed that high skill i nds it optimal to save and invest in the capital market
rather than having children if no pension system exists. For this to still be her optimal
strategy it must be the case that:
w
h





The pension benets x increase, while the tax payments vt decrease the opportunity
cost of having children. Thus, high pension contribution rates vt reduce the desirability
of market participation (and with it saving).
8It is assumed here that individuals view promised pension benets like private property and that
this view is justied by the country's political and legal system. For a further discussion on this and
similar issues see Diamond (1997).
9For the following analysis it is assumed that the [4] is satised which implies that
i nds the return of the market higher than the return via the family tradition. Her
optimal saving rate becomes:
s
i






t (1   vt)
Thus, compared with the case without government pension, the per capita saving rate
of a high skilled individual has been reduced for all positive values of x and/or vt. This
is the crowding out eect of the ER-DB-PAYG pension system that is widely discussed










all private saving will be crowded out.
3.2 Low Skilled Individuals
If an ER-DB-PAYG pension system exists, the budget constraints for young and old


























For j to nd it optimal to still have children once the public pension system is introduced
it must be the case that the return from having a child is larger than the income and
pension payments forgone by having a child. The participation constraint for having a
child for a low skill individual is as follows:
w
l





The ER-DB PAYG pension system thus has a twofold in
uence on the opportunity
cost of having children. The higher the level of benets x, the higher the opportunity
9For an empirical discussion of the crowding out of private savings due to PAYG pension systems
see for example Feldstein (1985).
10cost of having a child. On the other hand, the higher the tax rate, v, the lower the
opportunity cost of a child. The higher vt the more likely that (5) is satised and having
children will be the preferred vehicle to transport consumption into old age. This is
the case as increases in vt hurt the return on private savings more than the return on
children.
As long as (5) is satised the return from having children outweighs that of market

















It is interesting to note that while a high vt reduced the relative cost of children
in (5), the number of children a person will rear depends negatively on v. The rst









This term is always negative.
Thus, while increases in vt make it more likely that (5) is satised and hence an
individual has children, once (5) is satised a further increase in the tax rate vt will act
to reduce fertility. This is because an increase in vt will reduce young age consumption
c
y




j;t) by reducing fertility. The overall in
uence of vt on fertility is thus not
clear.
The in
uence of x on individual fertility is straightforward. Increases in x will
increase the opportunity cost of having a child in (5), as well as the optimal number of
children in (6). The ER-DB-PAYG system reduces j's fertility for all levels of x 2 (0;1].
Thus, the ER-DB-PAYG system crowds out fertility. A similar crowding out eect of
individual fertility due to PAYG pensions has been mentioned in Cigno (1993), Rosati
(1996), and Wigger (1999).
It is interesting to note that the introduction of the PAYG system will denitely
decrease saving by high skilled individuals. But if the introduction of the PAYG system
11alters (5) such that low skill individuals nd it optimal to switch from having children
as old age support to relying on a combination of public pension and private saving,
then their per capita savings rate increases. As long as x is not too high (such that
all private saving is crowded out) it could be that the increase in saving by the low
skilled would o-set the reduction in saving by the high skilled. Thus, the introduction
(or expansion) of an ER-DB-PAYG system could in principle decrease, increase or keep
total per capita saving unchanged. This ambigous eect of PAYG pension systems on
per capita saving occurs when individuals can use children as well as the capital system
to transport consumption into old age (this implies that children are - at least partially
- seen as investment goods). This ambiguous eect of PAYG pension systems on per
capita saving (and growth) have also been analyzed by Cigno and Rosati (1996), Zhang
and Zhang (1998), and Wigger (1999).
3.3 The derivation of the budget balancing tax rate
In the following it is assumed that the separation is perfect. That is, low skilled indi-
viduals will nd it optimal to transport consumption possibilities to old age via having
children, while high skilled individuals will nd it optimal to use the capital market.
In such a separating case, an old person at time t receives xwl
t 1(1   bGl
t 1) in the
form of a public pension if she is of the low skilled type and xwh
t 1 if she is of the high
skilled type. To provide all old agents at time t with their pensions, the government







t 1(1   )]Nt 1: (7)
Where Gl
t 1 denotes the average number of children born to low skill individuals in
period t   1. Note that the sum of generation t   1's children makes up generation
t, i.e., Nt 1Gl
t 1 = Nt. When the government levies a tax rate vt, the collective tax





t)vt + (1   )Ntw
h
t vt: (8)
12Since the current young pay the pensions of the current old, the collective tax payments
of the young must be sucient to nance the public pensions of the old. That is, it
must be the case that [7] must be equal to [8].
The tax rate on income that the government has to levy in order to balance the
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and Nt=Nt 1 = (1 + nt).
Let Lt = Nt[(1   bGl
t) + (1   )wh
t =wl
t] denote the quality-adjusted labor force
in period t and let (1 + lt) = Lt=Lt 1 denote the growth rate of this quality adjusted
labor force. The growth rate of this quality adjusted labor force can be further broken
down into the growth rate of population and the growth rate of quality adjusted labor
participation:
(1 + lt) = (1 + nt)(1 + gt):
The growth rate of the quality adjusted labor participation rate is given by:
(1 + gt) =
(1   bGt) + (1   )wh
t =wl
t













t <  Gt (10)
with  Gt as above.
The above equation represents the government's budget balancing equation for any
level of aggregate fertility in the range [0;  Gt]. If aggregate fertility lies outside this
range even a tax rate of 100 percent could not balance the budget. vt(Gt) is strictly
increasing in Gt for Gt <  Gt. Gt(vt) on the other hand is strictly decreasing in vt.
The budget balancing tax rate for period t is found by setting [6] equal to [10],
as shown in Figure 1 for the case of the parameter values used in the simulations in
13section 5. This equilibrium tax rate generates tax revenue exactly equal to the amount
needed to nance generation t   1's pension payments.
Insert Figure 1
4 Including Fertility Based Claims in a DBPAYG
Pension System
A fertility based component is now added to the pension system analyzed above. Under
this fertility based ERDB system the public pension received by an old person of gener-
ation t now consists of two parts: a part based on the contribution in the labor market
and a part based on individual fertility. The total payment to a high skill individual of
generation t combines these two parts:
x[(1   f)w
h






t is the fertility based part of the public pension system with the parameter
f 2 [0;1] set by the Government. The pension formula for low skill individuals is
identical except that it features the wage rate wl
t instead of wh
t . For a similar fertility
based component see Kolmar (1997).
When f = 0, there are no fertility based payments and hence the system is identical
to the one described in the previous section. In the other extreme case with f = 1,
public pension payments depend only on individual fertility.
The parameter f can in principle be adjusted over time by the government. As
before it is assumed however that such changes cannot be applied in retrospect. That
means, existing pension claims must be valued. The government therefore takes f as
well as x as given when calculating the budget balancing tax rate for a particular period
t.
For any given tax rate vt 2 [0;1], an individual i of generation t now maximizes the
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Apart from the extra term in the constraint determining old age consumption, this
maximization problem is identical to the one considered in (3).
Again, high skill individuals invest in the market only as long as the return from
doing so outweighs the benets available by having children:
w
h





This inequality can be rewritten as:








For now it is assumed that vt satises this inequality. If this is the case, Gi
t = 0 and
individual saving of the high skilled individuals will become:
s
h






t (1   vt)
:
Ceteris paribus, this savings rate of high skill individuals depends positively on f








Thus, ignoring the impact of vt, saving by high skill individuals would increase with
an introduction of the fertility part of the pension system. The reason is that the
introduction of the fertility based part of the PAYG system reduces the pension benet
of individuals without children. Thus for individuals without children, consumption
smoothing requires a transfer of young age resources to old age resources via additional
15saving. Of course, vt will be impacted by a change in f (vt can either rise or fall
in response to an increase in f) and we will discuss this relationship further in the
simulation section below.
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The opportunity cost of children has been reduced by the fertility based PAYG
system relative to the ER-DB-PAYG system of the previous section. For low skilled
individuals the return on saving will therefor still be lower than the return available
from having children. Thus, sl
t = 0 and Gl
t > 0.



















for vt   vt.
4.1 The derivation of the budget balancing tax rate
As before the government uses the tax revenue of generation t to pay for generation
t 1's pensions while balancing the budget. Since an individual old person of generation
t   1 will receive x[(1   f)wl
t 1(1   bGl
t 1) + fGl
t 1] in the form of a public pension if
she is of the low skilled type and x(1   f)wh
t 1 if of the high skilled type.
In a separating case a young person at time t will pay vt(1   bGl
t)wl
t in the form of
payroll taxes if unskilled and vtwh
t if skilled.
Balancing the budget while honoring the pension benets of the older generation
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As in the last section this budget balancing tax rate can be rewritten in terms of
















t <  Gt, with  Gt as above.
The equilibrium tax rate for period t is found by setting [6] equal to [14], as shown
in Figure 2 for the case of the parameter values used in the simulations in section 5 and
a fertility payment rate f of 0.2.
Insert Figure 2 Here
The budget balancing tax rate vt tends to increase in the rst period after the
introduction (or increase) of the fertility based component of the PAYG pension system.
This is because the incentive to have more children reduces the tax base to nance
existing pension obligations. However, by the second period after the introduction of
the fertility based component the budget balancing tax rate vt tends to fall below its
original level due to the increase in the population growth rate. The eect of a change
in f on other parameter values is discussed further in the next section.
5 Simulations
The dynamics of the model are analyzed here using simulations. There are eight pa-
rameters in the model. , b, k, Nt=Nt 1, wl
t, wh
t , (1 + 
t), and x. The rst simulation
evaluates the impact of wage growth and PAYG replacement rates on population growth
and sustainability of the pension system over time. The growth rate of wages, (1+ 
t),
17and the PAYG replacement rate, x, are allowed to vary while the remaining parameters
are set to the following values:  = 0:5, b = 0:1, wh
t = 3, wl
t = 0:9, Gl
t 1 = 2, k = 0:2,
 = 0:5.
In the following simulations  is set equal to 0:5. This means that for each individual
consumption is equal in both the young and old period. Re
ecting their higher produc-
tivity, high skilled individuals earn more than low skilled individuals, with wh
t = 3 and
wl
t = 0:9. It is assumed that both types of wages grow over time at the rate (1 + 
t).
The child contribution rate k is set equal to 0:2, which means that young people have
to transfer 1/15th of their gross income to their elderly parents if they are of the high
skill type and 2/9th if they are of the low skill type. The maximum number of children
per person is set to ten, so that b = 0:1. The number of children born in the starting
period is given by Gl
t 1 = 2. The percentage of low skilled skilled individuals in the
population is given by  which is set to 0.5 in the simulations.
5.1 The in
uence of x and 
 on sustainability
Figures 3 and 4 show the population dynamics for all possible combinations of x and

t. The gures were constructed using the following iterative process. In every round
the equilibrium allocation of Gt and vt is determined endogenously. Unless the system
collapses right away, these values then determine the starting values for the next period.
Insert Figure 3 Here
In Figure 3, 
, x combinations that lead to a stable population are represented by
the dark blue upward sloping line in double thickness. When only low skill individuals
have children and with  = 0:5 this occurs at Gt = Gl
t = 2.
Combinations of high wage growth and/or low PAYG replacement rates lead to
increasing population over time. On the other hand, combinations of low wage growth
and/or generous replacement rates lead to decreasing population over time which make
the PAYG system unsustainable.
The higher 
 the more attractive children are as old age security as parents can
18participate in the growing income of their children via their children's old age support
k. If 
t is high enough even high skilled individuals will nd the returns oered by the
family tradition more attractive than returns from the market and switch to having
children themselves. On the other hand, if 
t is too low even low skilled individuals
opt out of having children and rely on the market instead. For a gross interest rate of
Rt+1 = 2 these two "participation" constraints for low and high skilled individuals are
represented by the two thin green lines in Figure 3.
If a 
t   x combination falls below the lower of these participation lines, even low
skilled individuals opt out of having any ospring and instead use the capital market
together with PAYG pension system to secure their retirement consumption. Fertility
levels in this case fall to zero.10 
   x combinations that fall into the area above the
upper "participation constraint" indicate that high and low skilled individuals want to
have children and rely on the family tradition when old rather than the capital market.
Fertility rates are very high in this case but average per capita saving is zero.11
The two "participation" constraints depend on the return on the capital market as
indicated by Rt+1. Figure 3 assumes that Rt+1 = 2. For interest rates higher than this
both participation constraints move up, while they would move down if interest rates
were lower.
Area A in Figure 3 represents x and 
t combinations that lead to increasing pop-
ulation over time with complete separation between high and low skilled individuals.
In this region the fertility rate of low skilled individuals is high enough to make the
entire population increase over time. High skilled individuals do not have any children
and instead save for their retirement. Assuming no restriction in natural resources, the
10There is a certain amount of myopia assumed in this model. Individuals { even though otherwise
rational { do not believe that the PAYG pension system can collapse due to a lack of young people. If
they were completely rational, they would predict the collapse and hence not rely on it to provide old
age consumption.
11For a given 
t, fertility levels decline as the replacement rate x increases. The reason for this is
that a higher x makes market participation more attractive for low skilled individuals.
19population keeps growing, making the PAYG system cheap to run. The tax rate needed
to nance the PAYG system stays low (or decreases) over time, making the internal
rate of return of the PAYG system, which is given by x=vt = (1+
t)(1+lt)(1+nt), an
attractive alternative to investment in the capital market at an interest rate of Rt+1.12
Combinations of x and 
t that lie in Area B lead to a fertility decline over time.
Systems characterized by these parameter combinations are not sustainable in the long
run and eventually collapse due to a lack of young people. The further the 
t  x com-
bination lies away from the separation line between areas A and B, the less sustainable
it becomes. Just like region A, B is also characterized by complete separation in the
retirement behavior of low and high skilled individuals: low skilled individuals invest
in children while high skilled individuals save in the capital market.
Only parameter combinations that lie on the thick blue line along the boundary
between areas A and B lead to fertility rates that can guarantee stable population
growth.
C - the region above the "participation constraint" of high skilled individuals is
characterized by rapidly increasing population and no private saving by either group.
In contrast, parameter levels of 
t and x that lie below low skilled individuals' "par-
ticipation constraint" in region D, lead to a collapse of the PAYG pension system due
to a lack of a next generation. Since both low and high skilled individuals use the capi-
tal market and the public pension system instead of children to transport consumption
12This is a variation on the Aaron (1966) condition for a system with endogenous fertility. If
(1 + 
t)(1 + nt)(1 + lt) > Rt+1, welfare of high skilled individuals is higher under the PAYG system
compared with an unfunded system. On the other hand, high skilled individuals would be better o
under an unfunded system (or no system at all) if the inequality is reversed. Thus, this inequality
tells us only about the welfare of individuals that participate in the market. Individuals that rely on
children care about whether the return from the pension system is bigger or smaller than the return
from children, given by k=(b(1+
t)). Thus their "Aaron condition" is given by (1+
t)(1+nt)(1+lt) >
Rt+1 > k=(b(1 + 
t)). If it is then the PAYG system increases their individual welfare, and otherwise
not.
20possibilities into their retirement period, fertility falls to zero.
Figure 4 shows how these regions of sustainability change when a fertility based
component is introduced into the ER-DB-PAYG pension system. The most important
change is that the growth rate of wages (
t) needed to sustain a pension system with a
particular replacement rate is reduced. This improves the sustainability of the PAYG
system. As a consequence the thick black line that symbolizes the x   
 combinations
that lead to stable population growth moves downwards as f increases. Also, the
participation constraints for high and low skill types move downwards as f increases
which is illustrated by a downwards shift from the light green to the light blue lines
in Figure 4. This indicates that both types of individuals start to have children at a
lower growth rate of wages than previously, improving the sustainability of the PAYG
system.
Insert Figure 4 Here
The improvement in sustainablity can be attributed to the inclusion of the fertility
based part in the ER-DB-PAYG pension system which gives individuals a greater -
nancial incentive to have children. In other words the public good character of children
is reduced by the introduction of a fertility based pension component.
One potential shortcoming of the above analysis is that x and 
 are not strictly
independent in reality. As discussed in section 3 above, high levels of x crowd out
private saving of the high skilled individuals as well as fertility levels of the low skilled.
Both of these crowding out eects have an in
uence on the wage rate and thus 
. In a
neoclassical growth model the crowding out of private saving puts downward pressure
on wage rates due to a reduction in the capital-labor ratio. However, one can also argue
that the decrease in fertility increases the capital-labor ratio of the next generation and
therefore puts upward pressure on future wages.13 Thus, while it is clear that there are
interdependencies between x and 
 it is not always clear how a change in x in
uences
13In the present model a reduction in fertility would also increase the current participation rate
which then would decrease this period's capital-labor ratio and therefore reduce current wages.
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.
An analysis of the exact interaction of x and 
t in the present framework goes beyond
the scope of this article. Traditionally OLG models without endogenous fertility nd
that PAYG pension systems crowd out economic growth because of the rst of these
eects (the crowding out of private saving). Models with endogenous fertility and
children as investment goods (e.g., Cigno and Rosati (1996)) however nd that PAYG
systems could increase economic growth (and therefore wage growth) because of the
second eect (the reduction in fertility).
The eect of x on per capita saving rates is also not clear cut. In the present model
an increase in the level of x leads to a decrease in per capita saving by high skilled
individuals but to an increase in per capita saving by low skilled individuals. Again,
the aggregate eect could be positive or negative.
5.2 The in
uence of x and k on sustainability
Figure 5 shows how the sustainability of the PAYG system is aected by dierent levels
of x and k. It is assumed here that wages remain constant over time with (1+ 
t) = 1.
The straight downward sloping lines illustrate the "participation constraints" for high
and low skilled individuals respectively. They divide the k   x space into three main
areas. In the lowest part of the graph (below the low skill participation constraint) the
return from children is not high enough to induce either type of individual to invest in
children. If this is the case the fertility rate drops to zero immediately while the per
capita saving rate is quite high. This is of course followed by a collapse of the PAYG
system in the next period since there is no one around to pay the existing pension
liabilities.
Insert Figure 5 Here
The top part of the graph above the high skill participation constraint (Area C0)
illustrates the situation in which family tradition forces children to provide so generously
for their ageing parents that both low and high skill individuals want to rely on children
22rather than the market for old age protection. Fertility rates are high in area C0 and
even high PAYG replacement rates are sustainable over time but per capita private
savings are zero in this region. However, for a given level of k fertility declines as one
moves from the left to the right side of the graph. As every individual (whether or not
they nd it optimal to use the market to transfer consumption into old age) spends at
least part of her young age working in the market to nance young age consumption, a
high replacement rate x automatically covers some of their old age consumption even
if they were planning on having children. Thus { other things equal { the higher x the
greater the share of old age consumption that gets automatically covered by the public
pension and the lower the number of children born.
For x-k combinations that lie along the separating line between areas C0 and D0
population growth would be equal to replacement levels: Gt = Gh
t + Gl
t = 2. For
combinations that lie in region D0 fertility by high and low skilled individuals would lie
below the replacement level of Gt = Gh
t + Gl
t = 2.
If the k   x combinations lie between the two downward sloping participation con-
straints (pictured in red), low skilled individuals nd it optimal to have children while
high skilled individuals save. Combinations of k and x that fall into area A0 lead to
population increase over time, while combinations of k and x that fall into area B0
are characterized by decreasing populations. x and k combinations that lie along the
separation line between areas A0 and B0 lead to stable populations over time with
Gt = Gl
t = 2.
For systems that are characterized by the parameter combinations of region B0,
fertility rates are below replacement level. In such cases, a DBPAYG system is not
sustainable in the long run. A reduction in the pension benet rate x is one way
a government could try to prevent a collapse of the public pension system. Another
possibility to increase sustainability is to implement policies that will induce an increase
in the aggregate fertility level. One potential policy to achieve this is to include a fertility
based component into the ER-DB-PAYG pension system.
23Figure 6 illustrates what happens to sustainability if a fertility based component f
is introduced into the pension system. The main dierence to Figure 5 is that now with
f > 0 the region that represents growing population over time (A00) occupies a much
larger part of the graph. A00 now contains many of the combinations of k and x that
fell into the region of permanently shrinking populations B0 before. Figure 6 assumes
a fertility component of the pension system of f = 0:2. This trend becomes even more
pronounced if higher fertility based components of the PAYG system, f, are considered.
The arrows in Figure 7 illustrate how the lines move as f increases from 0 to 0.2.
Insert Figure 6 Here
Insert Figure 7 Here
Hence the inclusion of a fertility based component in the DBPAYG pension system
increases the likelihood that the system will be sustainable. This nding is consistent
with those of Cigno, Luporini and Pettini (2003) and Cigno and Werding (2007).
6 Conclusion
The overlapping-generations model of endogenous fertility developed here illustrates
how an earnings related dened benet pay-as-you-go (ER-DB-PAYG) pension system
can reduce the number of children born and hence sow the seeds of its own destruction.
It is also shown that the sustainability of a PAYG pension system can be increased by
including a fertility based component. These issues are of direct relevance to a number of
OECD countries that have generous ER-DB-PAYG pension systems and falling fertility
rates.
My simulations show that having a fertility based component in the DBPAYG pen-
sion system increases the likelihood that the system will be sustainable. In particular,
for parameter values that are plausible for many European countries, introducing a
modest fertility payment may be sucient to transform an unsustainable pension sys-
tem into one that is sustainable. It should be politically easier to nd a majority to
24agree with a change in f than with a switch from an unfunded to a funded pension sys-
tem or a reduction in xt. This is because changing the size of the pension parameter f
does not place as big a burden on the 'switching generation'. Assuming f can be altered
if fertility levels are too high or too low, this system also provides governments with
the necessary 
exibility to cope with changing population structures without increasing
uncertainty for pensioners.
The benchmark for this article is OECD countries with aging populations and gen-
erous PAYG pension systems. However, the analysis may also be relevant to developing
countries. Most developing countries have little or no public pension provision, but
high reliance on family ties. A parent's only source of income during old age comes
from their children's contributions. Those countries are characterized by low or zero
x values but relatively high k values. As can be seen from Figure 3 this combination
lies in region A, the area with exploding population. A country facing too high fertility
rates could therefore implement a dened-benet pension system in order to reduce
fertility rates. A moderate dened benet pension system would give individuals the
possibility to obtain old age consumption without relying completely on their children.
This will increase their incentives to work in the market and have less children. Also,
the introduction of such a pension system would reduce the incentives to work outside
the `ocial' market (in `black market activities') since pension payments are at stake.
It is of course the case that parents do not raise their children only as old age
security. They also derive emotional satisfaction from them. In this sense children
could be seen as durable consumer goods and one could argue that the utility derived
from having children should feature in a parent's utility function. This approach has
been used by Kolmar (1997) and Wigger (1999) among others. The present model
could easily be adapted to include children in the utility function by adding a `child-
consumption term'. This kind of utility function would induce people to invest more
time in children and make the declining fertility result less dramatic since people would
not stop having children completely even if k is zero. However, putting children into the
25utility function would not reverse the relationship between rising opportunity costs of
child-bearing and falling fertility rates and would therefore not eliminate the externality
eects of fertility decisions. The basic conclusions of the model would still remain the
same.
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